the personal attributes and styles of the major decisionmakers, are indeed well worth reading, and important to take into account.

At a time when the public, professional military men, the Congress, and President seem much less interested in nuclear weapons and "nuclear strategy," the book amounts to another relevant "wake-up call."

THE MILITARY LENS

Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Rlations

CHRISTOPHER P. TWOMEY

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The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations

By Christopher P. Twomey

Reviewed by Lauren Hickok, Student of International Politics and Security

In *The Military Lens*, Christopher P. Twomey greatly advances the scholarly literature on deterrence, doctrine, and the causes of war. He warns that the risk of a great power war between the United States and China is considerable—mainly because the two countries have very different ideas about how wars should be fought and won. As such, *The Military Lens* is of great practical interest to policymakers and senior members of the defense community—in both the United States and China.

Throughout the first third of the book, Twomey establishes the theoretical model he plans to test. Most importantly, he acquaints the reader with two related hypotheses: (1) the Doctrinal Difference Misperception Hypothesis, and (2) the Doctrinal Difference Escalation Hypothesis. According to the first hypothesis, nations with divergent theories of victory—to include military doctrine—are likely to misperceive and underestimate each other's capabilities. According to the second hypothesis, this underestimation is likely to result in failure of deterrence, escalation, and conflict.

The real substance of *The Military Lens* is presented in Part II, "Chinese and American Puzzles." Twomey begins by characterizing the doctrinal differences that led to the Korean War. American thinking emphasized the utility of air power and general war—whereas Chinese strategic thinking emphasized ground forces, limited war, and the trading of space for time. Ultimately, these doctrinal differences resulted in two separate cases of deterrence failure—the US decision to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea and Mao Zedong's decision to cross the Yalu River. Next, Twomey provides an example of a deterrence success—China's decision in 1950 to postpone the invasion of Taiwan. Here, deterrence was successful because the United States and China had similar theories of victory. In the Taiwan Strait, the relevant forces were naval forces for amphibious operations—and the amphibious operations doctrine of the United States was in fact very similar to that of China.

The final third of the book presents the reader with two additional cases describing doctrinal differences between Egypt and Israel—a fascinating

analysis that further establishes the reader's understanding of doctrinal difference theory, and raises new questions about how similar doctrinal differences might affect the United States and China in the future. A subsequent chapter generalizes about the theory's implications for the Taiwan Strait, and provides policy recommendations for reducing the risk of conflict.

What is most remarkable about *The Military Lens* is its interdisciplinary approach—which transcends traditional boundaries of political science, history, and public policy. *The Military Lens* begins in the realm of political science, developing a formal theory of doctrinal difference. Next, the cases provide historical context, and in some ways these chapters read like a history of the period, albeit one organized thematically. Indeed, the author quotes the principal historians of the Korean War, and he also references the statements of American and Chinese leadership. At times, the block quotations become cumbersome—but in most cases their inclusion is effective, demonstrating firsthand how each country assessed its adversary. Finally, the author provides a set of policy recommendations—something quite unusual for a formal work of political science.

The policy recommendations are one of the great strengths of *The Military Lens*—making the book an essential read for policymakers and senior members of the defense community. To minimize the effects of doctrinal difference, states should: (1) tailor signals to its adversary's perceptual framework or theory of victory; (2) red team their own net assessments of the adversary's forces, relying on area studies specialists, and; (3) develop military-to-military ties to help understand each side's theory of victory. The leaders of the United States and China should be sure to take note—because today, more than ever, the military doctrines of the two countries are diverging. The US military is currently pursuing a high-cost, high-technology revolution in military affairs. This differs markedly from the asymmetric assassin's mace (shashou jian) strategies that China's military has come to emphasize. The more that these approaches diverge, the greater the likelihood of missed signals and deterrence failure.

Ultimately, *The Military Lens* illuminates the way that doctrinal differences can lead to deterrence failure. As Twomey aptly summarizes: "When nations see the world through different military lenses, the risk of misperception and miscommunication in the conduct of their diplomacy and statecraft is even higher. Mitigating these dangers in the Taiwan Strait and beyond would help to advance the cause of peace and stability."